Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to investigate CEOs as leaders in manufacturing organizations. The focus is on the roles of CEOs in organizational adaptations to changing and continuously evolving external environments. Design/methodology/approach -The paper is grounded on a conceptual theory of molecular structuring inside organizations. The authors then investigate CEOs' leadership roles. For this purpose a long established Singapore perceptual database of corporate productivity practices is utilized. Two contrasting samples (N ¼ 65) of high and low adaptability manufacturing firms are obtained. Statistical technique of Pearson product correlation yields intriguing, contrasting patterns of findings. On the basis of these results, we then discuss the roles of CEOs in highly adaptive versus lowly adaptive manufacturing firms. Findings -The results are seen through the lenses of molecular structuring of organizations suggest a sharp contrast in the nature of the roles of CEOs. In organizations that are highly adaptive, there is much closer interactions. In the lowly adaptive, CEOs seem uninvolved, staying aloof from core operations of their firms. Research limitations/implications -Since, the contrasting samples are from within the manufacturing sector, these insights are particularly relevant to China as a global manufacturing centre. Originality/value -This is the first paper of its kind to empirically validate the prescriptions of Lao Tzu, the ancient Chinese sage and author of the 2,500 years old Tao Te Ching.
Introduction
Ever since the publication in the 1930s of Barnard's (1938) The Functions of the Executive, there had been continuing research interests on the duties, roles, tasks, practices, functions and roles of the upper echelons -top management -in internally managing firms organizations (Drucker, 1954 (Drucker, , 1974 Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Eccles and Nohria, 1992; Mintzberg, 1973) in responding to external, changing, evolving and prevalently chaotic environments. Adapting to changes, there has internally to be, constant reconfiguring to new structural forms involving re-teaming, developing and training in new skills. Within the manufacturing sector, in adapting to faster moving, external environments, there likely has to be the implementations of new technology (Burns and Stalker, 1961) whether labor saving, information processing, quality enhancing or even artificial intelligences. The goal remains for firms through such actions, whether these are administrative behavioral changes (Simon, 1957) , structural reforms resulting in transitional and/or strategic changes, to be coping effectively with the challenges of external environments. Such is the extent in the interests of strategy scholars that there is now a long and still continuing stream of literature (Dill, 1958; Parsons, 1956; Chandler, 1962; Cyert and March, 1963; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967; Fouraker and Stopford, 1968; Blau and Schoenherr, 1971; Hall, 1972; Perrow, 1970; Aldrich, 1979; Beckhard and Harris, 1977, Meyer et al., 1978; Miles and Snow, 1978; Mintzberg, 1979; Child, 1997) .
If anything else the global environments are becoming now even more ruthlessly competitive and consequently highly volatile. And even more so in near future within the manufacturing sector, especially when the world has to come face to face with the onslaught of recent largely unanticipated, fiercely competitive Chinese manufacturing. For as Napoleon Bonaparte is likely to be putting it about the culturally so uniquely different (from the West) China: "The Dragon has arisen." That is when the Chinese manifest as did the Japanese before them in the 1980s their strengths if not a complete mastery of implementing rapid, flexible, high quality, new science and knowledge-driven yet mass production manufacturing. To stay in the game, global manufacturing firms have no choice but learn to cope with aggressive environments (Maniha and Perrow, 1965) .
In firms coping with competitive, hostile, aggressive, fast changing environments, the CEO remains central. In information gathering, his scanning of environments (Aguilar, 1967; Daft et al., 1988 ) is crucial for organizational success. For formally, he sits on top of a hierarchy (Blau and Scott, 1962 ) and whether it is by muddling (Lindblom, 1959 (Lindblom, , 1968 or thinking (Bruner et al., 1956 ) logically through to decisions, his strategies (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963 ) move, if not be propelling organizations. Equally, but less as often and likely in manufacturing sector, the CEO may choose to act cautiously, changing his organization only by increments (Quinn, 1980) . What is clear, the essence of what is like being the CEO remains one of a long and abiding interest to strategy scholars (Carter, 1971; Hambrick and Cannella, 2004; Henderson and Fredrickson, 1996; Miller and Friesen, 1983; . In particular of the dynamic roles of the CEO in adapting large, complex organizations (Etzioni, 1961; Perrow, 1972; Galbraith, 1973; Gabarro, 1987) to "high velocity" environments (Eisenhardt and Bourgeosis, 1988) as often encountered in certain sectors of manufacturing industries.
Our central interest too is in the CEO but in discovering what in essence is his role in engendering adaptability inside firms: how firms internally configure/reconfigure themselves to adapt to external changes. Owing to such volatile, rapidly transforming, even chaotic times, firm has to be adaptable so as to survive. Thus, it is adaptability (Vickers, 1959) of firms and CEO's role therein which is the raison d'etre for embarking upon this investigation rather than a firm's economic or financial performance (Rumelt, 1974; Child, 1972 Child, , 1975 . For us, being adaptable is synonymous with being effective (Pennings, 1975) . Without Darwinian adaptations (metaphorically) to changing environments, even high financially performing but rigidly structured, bureaucratic, production firms (Stinchcombe, 1959) within the manufacturing economic sector are Empirical Tao of the CEO unlikely to thrive. For a firm's financial results is but only one snapshot in measuring performance. Adaptability however is often an operating cause behind why a firm is surviving. We now turn to our overarching hypothesis and underlying conceptual model.
Overarching hypothesis
In our endeavors, we are much persuaded by the earlier work of scholars who are in search for a typology of adaptability and structure (Segal, 1974) . In our literature review, we discover an interesting almost lineage like series of scholars pursuing similar interest (Pugh et al., 1968; Carper and Snizek, 1980; Miller, 1976; Miller and Friesen, 1977; Inkson et al., 1970) . Our idea is to discover, if there are any, configuration differences in the patterning of structural forms in the internal organizing of firms (Diesing, 1971 ) between these two categories: the less versus more adaptable firms. The overarching hypothesis that has guided our research endeavors may be put as follows:
Overarching hypothesis. Is there a difference in organizational configurations between the less and more adaptable firms -and roles of the CEOs within such contexts?
Like earlier scholars (Miller, 1982; Miller and Friesen, 1984; McKelvey, 1978) , we derive from science our terminology, an imagery for interpreting the nature of organizing. We look towards biochemistry for our inspiration, the key phrase being "inter-molecular interactions" (Foo, 1992) . In particular, we are interested in organizing "intensity" (Pondy, 1969) in terms of co-relatives, as measures of degree, extent, depth and level of coordinative interactions. The essential tool for our modeling of "structure" inside firms is in using co-relational analyses. Such work is consistent with efforts of scholars like Miller (1979) who investigated contextual influences in the patterns of associative, bi-variations. Indeed 2,500 years ago, China's most famous strategic thinker, Sun Tzu (Foo and Grinyer, 1994) , drew on Taoism, utilized water as a metaphor in depicting how the army should be structured. Besides, "water" Sun Tzu drew too on the metaphor from physics -concept of momentum (Miller and Friesen, 1977) -in how an army may thus achieve momentum in attacking. Our underlying conceptual model (Figure 1 ) focuses on the CEO implementing policy statements, explication of goals, use of indicators, system for gain-sharing and feedback to reinforce his leadership roles in formulating, planning for and implementing strategy (Ansoff, 1965; Ackoff, 1970; Andrews, 1980) . Thus, this category of variables is collected under "CEO-Strategy" group of variables. What interest us most is in the internal processes and especially in how the CEO-Strategy variables interact with implementations for corporate improvements. In terms of economics, there are but two key sets of inputs in the production process: capital (investments in technology) and labor (i.e. people). So, first we devote our attention to measures taken in orienting people towards improving performance. Such measures include efforts to heighten "awareness" on the need for corporate improvements. Or in coordinating "cost-cutting" to sharpen corporate profits improvements. A range of possible orientations: "suggestion" "quality" "job redesign" "incentives" and "information sharing." Our implicit hypothesis being that CEO's personal involvements ought to be coordinative with such implementations.
Since, orientations of people often require training and development (Lant et al., 1992) in terms of concepts, skills and techniques; secondly, we co-relate the CEO-strategy category of variables with the entire organizational hierarchical emphases in training: top management, middle and supervisory and clerical as well as those at the production floor, the workers. Thirdly, on the capital dimension (technology), CEO-strategy as a category is co-related with a wide range in the implementations of technology for corporate improvements in terms of labor saving, information processing, enhancing product quality and artificial intelligence. Next, we discuss briefly our database and analytical methodology.
Database, scales and methodology Essentially our sub-samples of contrasting "low" versus "high" adaptable firms (N, range 60-65) are derived from the already known, now long established (Foo, 1990 (Foo, , 1992 (Foo, , 1997 , Singapore database (beginning, N ¼ 70; now overall, N ¼ 1,642). The database is established through collecting via Likert-type perceptual scales of the internal organizing (Weick, 1969; Katz and Kahn, 1966 ) from wide diverse universes. Respondents are mainly working executives attending National Productivity Board courses or on programs as lectured by the first author. Out of the overall sample of 1,642 firms we obtain more than a third to be in the manufacturing (N ¼ 652) sector. Measures are obtained by asking respondents: To what extent is the following typical of the approaches used by your company to improve productivity? And providing these as scales: none, 1; little, 2; some, 3; large, 4 and very large, 5 in the pre-tested questionnaires.
The critical question that enables us to derive the two sub-samples of firms in the manufacturing sector for co-relational analyses is in: How do you rate your company when compared to your major competitors? The scales provided are as follows for the item of our main interest -adaptability to market changes -much below average, 1; below average, 2; average, 3; above average, 4 and much above average, 5. Most interestingly, more than a third (N ¼ 247) of the manufacturing firms are rated by their employees as being in the "norm" or "average" classification on market adaptability. For the "above average" rating, there are 222 firms (this excludes 94 firms in the "much above average" classification) and this is in sharp contrast to only 65 firms being perceived as "below average." For the purpose of our study, we therefore instituted Empirical Tao of the CEO a computer-generated random sampling of the "above average" sample. Following these procedures, we obtain two samples, the less versus the more adaptable firms.
Low adaptors versus high adaptors
Owing to the different contingencies that may impact on organization structure, we have to ensure the two samples are more or less comparable. For example, early on Greiner (1972) sees organizations evolving before "revolutionizing" as they grow in size. That there are stages in how an organization develops (Lavoie and Culbert, 1978) . More importantly, early empirical work has validated the impacts of size on structure (Terrien and Mills, 1955; Klatzky, 1970) . For across a number of key measures of corporate size (number of employees employed) (Table I ), CEO age (Table II) and even internal work environment (presence of union and quality control circle (QCC))( The critical difference lies in the ages of CEOs. The "low adaptors" are almost twice as many in percentage terms within the young CEO age category (meaning 30-39 years) but this observation is being counter-balanced by their much stronger presence in the older CEO age group (50-59 years): 32.8 percent versus 18.2 percent. But with 63.6 percent of CEOs (only 35.9 percent for "low adaptors") in the "high adaptors" to be in the age range of 40-49 years, this category may well be said to be the "ripe, golden age" for manufacturing CEOs. For this fact may partially account for why these firms are better in adapting to environmental changes. For this reason we decide to focus on the roles or "Tao" of the CEO in our co-relational analyses.
In terms of internal working environment, there is more striking similarities than in differences. For example, in terms workers having a voice, the unionisation rate is almost identical: 36.9 percent ("low" adaptors) versus 36.4 percent ("high" adaptors). Less striking but still by and large similar is in the rate of workers' participation through QCCs: 57.6 percent (for "high adaptors") versus 41.5 percent. This result is suggestive of workers' participation as possibly a contributory factor in better corporate adaptation to external environmental changes.
Besides these considerations, we compare hierarchical status of the respondents (Tables IV-VI) . In this aspect the two samples may be said once more, to be by and large similar: for the "high adaptors," the contributions by those at managerial level tend to dominate 43.7 percent as in the case for "low adaptors" 57.2 percent. For contributions from the supervisory levels, the two samples are almost the same: 30.3 percent ("low" adaptors) versus 32.8 percent. It is only in the non-executive segment where the "high adaptors" (23.4 percent) are almost twice as many as in the "low adaptors" (12.7 percent). We are also able to compare the distribution of both samples in terms of the year in which the data have been captured. The longitudinal (Miller and Friesen, 1982) nature of data collection have meant that these cases now spanned over a period of seven years (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) . As may be seen, the percentages for the two samples are comparable: "low adaptors" versus "high adaptors" being 12.5 percent versus 14.9 percent for first year, then subsequently, 2nd year, 35.9 percent versus 46.3 percent; 3rd year, 10.9 percent versus 3 percent; 4th year, 7.8 percent versus 16.4 percent; 5th year 17.2 percent versus 6 percent; 6th year 6.3 percent versus 6 percent; and 7th year 9.4 percent versus 7.5 percent. If there is any pattern it is that the "low adaptors" are lower but then only marginally so within the earlier half of the period. The differences are narrow and clearly are not sufficiently wide enough for attribution to be made for the results to be simply sample-specific. Moreover, since different industries are likely to be impacted differently even in the same year, we investigated the distribution in terms of industry for the two samples. Here, again it is fair comment to say the distributional structures are more or less comparable. The only exceptions and these ought to be remembered when interpreting any results: the presence of firms from the chemical industry in the "high adaptors" sample and the corresponding absence of any firm from the highly volatile, textile industry. Otherwise, despite the diversity of the industries being represented, these are found in both samples. Note also that more than a third (. 33.33 percent) of both samples (i.e. 34.1 percent (for "low adaptors") versus 37.5 percent ("high adaptors")) are classified as in "others" but still within the broad manufacturing classification. Most importantly, firms in high technology, volatile environments are represented within both samples: computer ("low adaptors" 4.5 percent versus "high adaptors" 14.6 percent), and similarly, electronics (18.2 percent versus 20.8 percent) and semi-conductor (11.4 percent versus 8.3 percent).
Empirical results
Our approach to test our hypothesis is through a modelling strategy. That is to utilize co-relational analyses (Bobko, 1995) as the means to construct interactions. In metaphorical terms, it is to unveil the internal, organizational dynamics as patterns of "inter-molecular, inter-action" structures. Clearly in our first set of co-relational analyses (Tables VII and VIII) suggests that for orienting an organization, the roles of CEO in being involved or "hands-on" are pivotal. In contrast to the "low adaptability" sample or "low adaptors" the CEO in "high adaptability" firms is far more deeply involved (at statistical sig. of 0.01 level) with almost all of (excepting, surprisingly value creation, at 0.05 level of sig.) the orientation measures. Since, the size of the two samples is by design comparable (60-66), the co-relational scores as obtained may meaningfully be compared and analysed. Thus, the only statistical significant correlation in the "low adaptability" sample is between CEO and incentives (0.249; 0.05 sig. level). For the highly adaptable firms, this measure is about twice as large (0.428; 0.01 sig. level) and clearly more highly, statistically significant.
Whilst for the CEO correlations it is useful to be investigating in detail, the rest of the correlations are better evaluated from a "bird's eye" perspective. For this reason the Tables IX and X are generated. As is immediately apparent, inside the "low adaptors," vertically, it is only use of "indicators" (as part of category of CEO Strategy variables) is co-related with the entire range of corporate orientation practices. Horizontally, across the sample, only "suggestion scheme" is inter-molecularly, co-relating with the Empirical Tao of the CEO all the CEO-Strategy measures except for CEO being involved. In sharp contrast, the overall inter-molecular pattern inside the "high adaptors" is one of across the board (only one exception) of intriguingly, statistically significant correlations. This suggests a mental model, one of dynamic interactions most likely with the CEO at its central axis (note the strength of CEO correlations). This is the first empirical documentation of the Tao of the CEO in action, as he or she re-orients the firm in changing to cope with the dynamic, external environments. We investigate the correlations between the CEO-Strategy variables in the implementation of technology for corporate improvements.
CEO strategy and technology
Here again, the results obtained are consistent with what has been obtained for the orientation variables (Tables XI and XII) . Looking first at the details, the role of the CEO seems pivotal for high adaptability (relative to industry) to result. Within the high adaptors, CEO involvement is consistently correlated in statistically significant (at 0.1 level of statistical significance or less) manner across all the technology variables. This contrasts with an almost utter lack of statistically significant correlations except for the implementation of product quality enhancing technology (0.212, at 0.1 level of statistical sig.). These results suggest the role of CEO in being involved to be essential for firms to be highly adaptive to change to environments. We turn to the rest of the CEO-strategy variables. Like before, the use of "indicators" is consistently correlated in both instances (low adaptors versus high adaptors) across all the technology variables: labor saving, information, product quality enhancing and artificial intelligence. Interestingly, feedback as part of CEO-Strategy too appears here to correlate with all technology variables in both the "low and high" adaptability situations. This makes good intuitive sense. For since investments in technology for corporate improvements are costly, there is a requirement for feedback in both circumstances as to their effectiveness in implementation. Examining the correlations in detail is however highly instructive. Consistently, across technology implementation for labor saving (high versus low: 0.507 versus 0.269), information (0.509 versus 0.404) and product quality enhancing (0.481 versus 0.340), the scores are inevitably significantly higher. This is especially so for labor saving and suggest that the nature of feedback mechanism to be crucial for firms to be more highly adaptable. The pattern of correlations when seen from a horizontal perspective, implementing technology for enhancing quality of product appears to be most consistently correlated with all CEO-strategy variables. This is the case for both the "high" and "low" adaptability samples. Again the statistical details are insightful. In particular, the scores are much higher in the case of "high" adaptors for "gain-sharing" (contrast 0.454 versus 0.395) and as discussed before, "feedback."
The molecular results as shown in Tables XIII and XIV are equally interesting. There are three main observations. First, the overall impression again suggests the pivotal role of the CEO. That is his involvement is more likely to engender a proactive organization in implementing technology. Secondly, that again the picture of a highly adaptive firm is one of intense interactivity, perhaps analogous to molecular type interactions. Most intriguingly, one sees in terms of molecular structure of highly Empirical Tao of the CEO adaptive firms that each of the CEO-Strategy variables to be interacting with all Technology variables and vice-versa. Thirdly and in contrast, in the less as highly adaptive or "low adapting" firms there are gaps in inter-molecular, co-relations: CEO-strategy category of variables, CEO, policy and the sharing of gains. Fourthly, besides the CEO variable, the most striking contrast is in the lack (0.111, not statistically significant) of any statistically significant correlation for gain-sharing with implementing labor saving in "low adapting" firms and the highly statistically significant correlation (0.507, highly statistically significant at 0.01 level) for the "high" adaptors. The molecular interaction (in terms of co-relational measure) is more than four times as intense in the "highly" adaptive firms as in the "lowly" adaptive. Finally, the overall presence of interactions for policy and goals with labor saving technology in "highly" adaptive firms is in contrast correspondingly, its absence (or weak presence) within the "lowly" adaptive. This suggests the highly adaptive firms are probably more aware of the possible motivational impacts when implementing technology for saving labor to be setting up a policy framework and in specifying goals and targets. Finally, we turn to CEO-strategy and training category of variables.
CEO strategy and training
Here again we see results consistent with the vital role of the CEO in being involved (Tables XV and XVI) . Looking at the detailed statistical results, none of the correlations with CEO in the "low" adaptability sample is statistically significant. In sharp contrast, there is a pattern of highly statistically significant correlations (all at 0.01 level of statistical significance) across all the hierarchical levels of training: top management (0.402), then bulging at the "widest" middle management level (0.465), supervisory (0.354), clerical staff (0.318) and then production workers (0.344). This is clearly is an intriguing finding and suggests CEO's involvement with this level of the hierarchy to be most pivotal in configuring an adaptive organization. Also, it is consistent with theory of the crucial role of management at the middle. inter-molecular perspective, it is the intensity of interactions at this level results in highly adaptive firms. Another very interesting result is in the correlation between feedback and production workers' training. The utter lack of any statistically significant correlation within the "low adaptable" firms may be contrasted with the highly statistically significant result of production workers' training with the institutionalizing of corporate feedback mechanism (0.422; sig. at 0.01 level). Clearly, this result reinforces on the requirements of involving the people, especially those on the production floor so as to engender a highly responsive organization.
As before, the inter-molecular results are being mapped out in Tables XVII and XVIII. One of the most intriguing insights from this research is the plain fact that certain interactions, in the inter-molecular sense are more critical than others. Despite the wide patterning of interactions (statistically significant correlations) across the matrices, viewing the results vertically of "policy," "goals," "indicators" and Empirical Tao of the CEO "gain-sharing," these firms all remain within the "low adaptability" sample. Consequently, it is not just in the wide patterning of "molecular-like" interactions for firms to make the transition from "low" to become "highly" adaptable. The key as suggested by the patterning of interactions is in the critical role of the CEO: the entire column of the "lowly" adaptable firms is emptied of any statistically significant correlations.
Towards a molecular, Tao of CEO Painting on a vast canvas, Weber (1969) develops a theory on the sociology of the economic organization. More ambitious scholars even attempt to prescribed on organizational design (Starbuck and Dutton, 1978; Pfeffer, 1978; Donaldson, 2001) which by itself has its own stream of literature. Here, our attempts are to outline the possible implications in CEO-organizing for adaptability to market changes. To answer this we attempt first to visualize the results through the using "molecular circles" representing the variables. Three sets of figures are shown below in the order of preceding discussion: CEO-Strategy category of variables with these categoriesorientation, technology and training and development. In each case the "highly adaptive sample" is set against the "lowly" adaptable firms. Since, the focus is on the Tao of CEO, the other correlating variables are left unnamed.
What is most significant is in the consistency in the tight, inter-molecular pattern for the "highly adaptive": the Tao of the CEO is to become immersed in a highly interactive manner, almost as if to flow along with internal activities of firms. CEO has to be there, responding to queries, personally setting directions in orientating people, implementing new technology or in training and developing staff. Only through highly inter-molecular interactions may a firm be highly adaptive to market changes. The imagery also points to where and when the CEO is personally less than totally, personally immersed in organizing, then the likelihood is in the firm becoming less than as "highly" adaptive. Thus, in Figure 2 , we see for the "lowly" adaptive firms that the CEO is more likely to be narrowly responsive. This is the same for Figure 3 where the CEO is seen to be as equally unresponsive. This perspective is reinforced in the last Figure 4 : CEO is not personally at all responsive to any measures to improve corporate performance through training and development across the hierarchy.
This brings us to cite a passage from the 2,500 years old, Tao Te Ching by Lao Tsu that is highly relevant in depicting the Tao of the CEO. Here, Lao Tsu was then explicating on the Tao of the Sage yet his words of admonition are as applicable to the modern day CEO of manufacturing firms. In last few lines of Chapter 63 of the Ching is the writing is in the terse, archaic Chinese, it is possible to interpret and render his words in a variety of ways. The essence of his thinking may be in our context as applied to CEOs be said to be as follows:
The CEO in taking things easy, Is bound to be experiencing difficulties. The Sage in always anticipating difficulties, Never ever, does the Sage encounter any.
Here in lies a call for CEOs to stay involved so to anticipate possible difficulties that may arise. For manufacturing firms, one of the critical factors for survival is in being adaptive, always anticipating changes. By contrasting the "above average" successes with the "less than average" failures we are able to gain deep and even philosophically consistent insights on the proper roles of the CEO. Such empirical results, like overconfidence of CEOs contributing to failure (Hayward et al., 2004) are necessary as reminders. Here, the message is clear: CEOs must internally be immersed for the firm to avoid market failures (Charan and Colvin, 1999) . That is besides other essential lessons to be learned by CEO in leading (Meindl et al., 1985) . 
